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How do international relative prices—measured by the real exchange rate or the terms of trade—
respond to government spending and technology shocks? This question is pivotal to understanding
the international transmissionmechanismandhasbecomethe topic ofa considerabledebate. Overall,
the existing evidence appears to be hard to reconcile with the predictions of both Mundell-Fleming
type and intertemporal business cycle models under standard calibrations. These modeling frame-
workssuggestthatrelativeprices ofdomesticgoodsincreasein responseto expansionarygovernment
spending shocks, becausesuch shocksraise the total demand for domestic goods; technology shocks,
instead, lower relative prices, because they raise the supply of domestic goods.1
When confronted with the data, these predictions have found little support. Several studies have
identiﬁed government spending shocks within vector autoregresssion (VAR) models on the basis of
short-run restrictions, notably by ruling out a contemporaneous response of government spending to
the state of the economy. Considering quarterly data, Kim and Roubini (2008), Monacelli and Perotti
(2006) and Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2007) ﬁnd a depreciation of the real exchange rate in
response to an expansionary government spending shock. Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaasen (2008),
in contrast, consider annual data and ﬁnd an exchange rate appreciation. The evidence on the terms
of trade, as we discuss below, is also mixed. Concerning technology shocks, Corsetti, Dedola and
Leduc (2006) and Enders and M¨ uller (2008) estimate VAR models and identify positive innovations
to technology on the basis of long-run restrictions. Considering different samples, both studies ﬁnd
an appreciation of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade.
In this paper, we employ an alternative, conceptually quite distinct approach to simultaneously iden-
tifying government spending and technology shocks within an estimated VAR model in order to
re-examine the dynamic behavior of international relative prices. Following Uhlig (2005), we im-
pose sign restrictions on the impulse response functions of selected variables for a limited period
after the shock which we thereby attempt to identify.2 Crucially, we leave the response of the real
exchange rate and the terms of trade unrestricted, but restrict some of the signs of the responses of
other variables included in the VAR model; notably those of output, investment, the governmentbud-
get balance, inﬂation and the short-term interest rate. In our view, the restrictions reﬂect what most
economist have in mind when thinking about the effects of technology and government spending
shocks.
1In the following, we do not explicitly consider the possibility of a Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect. Instead, we focus
on the behavior the real exchange rate and the terms of trade.
2Early contributions to the development of this approach include Canova and Pina (1999) and Canova and de Nicolo
(2002), who put sign restrictions on impulse response correlations. Faust (1998) also proposes to impose sign restrictions
on impulse responses, which are, however, set only on impact. Recent open economy applications of the sign restriction
approach have been mostly focusing on monetary policy shocks, including Faust and Rogers (2003), Farrant and Peersman
(2006), and Scholl and Uhlig (2007). Fratzscher, Juvenal and Sarno (2007) focus on the behavior of the U.S.current account.
2At the same time, to give a formal underpinning of the restrictions and to quantify the horizon over
whichthesignofaselectedresponseisrestricted,weusearichlyspeciﬁeddynamicstochasticgeneral
equilibrium (DSGE) model. Speciﬁcally,we use a two-country framework with price rigidities where
each country specializes in the production of a particular set of goods. We study the predictions of
the model for a wide range of possible parameterizations by randomizing the values of parameters
which are critical in shaping the international transmission mechanism. For each draw, we compute
the impulse responses to shocks to government spending, technology and, in addition, monetary
policy. On the basis of this experiment, we ﬁnd that the model does not provide clear predictions for
the behavior of international relative prices. Yet it delivers robust implications for the behavior of
several important variables. This result is key to our empirical strategy: it allows us to use the model
to derive identiﬁcation restrictions while simultaneously leaving the response of international prices
unrestricted.
In a second step, we estimate a VAR model on quarterly time series for the U.S. relative to an aggre-
gate of industrialized countries for the post-Bretton-Woods period 1975Q1–2005Q4. In the baseline
speciﬁcation we identify governmentspending and technology shocks using our sign restrictions, as-
suming that these shocks are orthogonal to each other. We ﬁnd that the real exchange rate as well as
the terms of trade depreciate in response to expansionary government spending shocks and appreci-
ate in response to positive shocks to total factor productivity. Sensitivity analyses suggest that these
ﬁndings are quite robust. For instance, if we additionally identify monetary policy shocks, our results
are virtually unaltered. The same applies to changes in sample period as well as to the inclusion of
additional variables.
Taking a theoretical perspective, our ﬁndings may shed new light on the extent of international risk
sharing. In a benchmark scenario of complete international ﬁnancial markets, country-speciﬁc risk is
effectivelypooledacrosscountries. This has importantimplications for the internationaltransmission
of government spending and technology shocks, because both shocks alter the amount of resources
availableto theprivatesector. Whilegovernmentspendingshocksincreasethetaxburdenofdomestic
residents, technology shocks increase domestic output for a given amount factor inputs. Full risk
sharing under complete ﬁnancial markets spreads the wealth effect induced by these shocks across
countries; as a consequence, the impact of country-speciﬁc shocks on domestic variables relative to
their foreign counterpart is rather contained. In fact, the effect of a particular shock on domestic
and foreign consumption (and work effort in case preferences are non-separable in consumption and
leisure) will differ only to the extent that consumption baskets differ across countries—as reﬂected
by the response of the real exchange rate.
However, it is empirically plausible to assume that the set of state-contingent securities traded across
countries and, hence, the scope of explicit risk-sharing, is limited. Movements in international rel-
3ative prices, i.e. the terms of trade and the real exchange rate, are crucial for the extent of implicit
international risk-sharing under these circumstances, see Cole and Obstfeld (1991). Speciﬁcally, if—
as standard calibrations of international business cycle models suggest—the terms of trade depreciate
in response to technology shocks and appreciate in response to government spending shocks, one
obtains an implicit ex-post insurance of country-speciﬁc risk. These movements in relative prices
imply a revaluation of national outputs which tends to counteract the immediate effect of the shocks
on available resources.
Yet, underincompleteﬁnancialmarkets,relativepricemovementscanalsoamplifytheriskassociated
with country-speciﬁcshocks,asshownin a recentcontribution byCorsetti, DedolaandLeduc(2007).
In fact, for a particular calibration, an otherwise standard business cycle model is shown to predict
an appreciation of the real exchange rate in response to a country-speciﬁc technology shock. Below,
we use our DSGE model to show that international relative price movements may similarly amplify
the consumption risk stemming from government spending shocks. In the light of these theoretical
results, our empirical ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that international price movements tend
to amplify rather than to reduce consumption risk across countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss existing evidence and
identiﬁcation strategies. In section 3 we outline a standard general equilibrium business cycle model,
which we simulate to derive sign restrictions for selected impulse responses. In section 4 we discuss
our VAR speciﬁcation and present results obtained on the basis of our identiﬁcation strategy. Section
5 concludes.
2 Identiﬁcation
2.1 Recent approaches and results
Before outlining our approach to identiﬁcation, we brieﬂy discuss a number of recent VAR studies,
which are concerned with either government spending or technology shocks and their effect on real
exchange rates. The evidence to date is mixed and to some extent conﬂicting with conventional
wisdom.
Government spending shocks The textbook version of the Mundell-Fleming model predicts that
an exogenous increase in government spending appreciates the real exchange rate.3 Intertemporal
business cycle models under standard calibrations also predict that exogenous increases in govern-
3The implicit assumption is that the increase in spending is debt ﬁnanced. In the case of tax ﬁnance, Frenkel and Razin
(1987) show that the exchange rate may depreciate because of exogenous money supply: lump-sum taxes lower disposable
income and thus money demand such that the exchange rate depreciates. Also, in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) the nominal
exchange rate depreciates in response to an increase in domestic government spending due to a fall in money demand (PPP
holds in their model) and money supply being exogenously determined.
4mentspendingappreciateinternationalrelativeprices. Backus,KehoeandKydland(1994)providean
early analysis within a frictionless two-country business cycle model. The result, however, survives
under various frictions. Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2005), for instance, employ a richly speciﬁed dy-
namic general equilibrium model with incomplete ﬁnancial markets, sticky prices and rule-of-thumb
consumers; they also ﬁnd an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Recently, several attempts have been made to identify government spending shocks in quarterly
time series data. The identifying assumption which is commonly employed goes back to Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) and excludes a contemporaneous response of government spending to other key
macroeconomic variables. Kim and Roubini (2008) analyze U.S. times series for the period 1973–
2002 and ﬁnd that the real exchange rate depreciates in response to spending shocks. Monacelli and
Perotti (2006) consider data for the U.S. as well as data for Canada, Australia and the U.K. covering
theyears1975–2001. Theyalsoﬁndadepreciationoftherealexchangerate,exceptforCanada. Ravn
et al. (2007) pool the data of all four countries and estimate a panel VAR for the period 1975–2005.
In line with the aforementioned papers they ﬁnd a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
Beetsmaetal.(2008)obtaindifferentresultsfortheeffectsofgovernmentspendingshocksonthereal
exchange rate. Within a panel VAR model estimated on annual data for 14 European countries they
ﬁnd an appreciation. Clearly, differences may be due to identiﬁcation assumptions. While Beetsma
et al. (2008) also exclude a contemporaneousresponse of governmentspending to the other variables
included in the VAR model, this assumption is more restrictive in the context of annual data. At the
same time, the identiﬁcation scheme is arguably less prone to be biased by anticipation effects.
The narrative approach to the identiﬁcation of government spending shocks, suggested by Ramey
and Shapiro (1998), is a widely applied alternative to the Blanchard-Perotti approach. Monacelli
and Perotti (2006) discuss it in an open economy context. Speciﬁcally, they estimate the effects of
the Carter-Reagan military buildup using a dummy variably for the ﬁrst quarter of 1980. They ﬁnd
that governmentspending falls, while the real exchangerate depreciates during the ﬁrst year after the
shock,i.e. theyﬁnd a co-movementofgovernmentspendingandthe realexchangerate which squares
well with conventional wisdom.
Taken together, these results illustrate the importance of identiﬁcation in the analysis of the effects of
government spending in the open economy. Discussing the vices and virtues of both the Blanchard-
Perotti and the narrative approach to the identiﬁcation is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead,
we attempt to complement the existing evidence on the basis of an alternative identiﬁcation scheme
based on sign restrictions.4
Before providing a brief summary of the existing evidence on the effects of technology shocks on
international relative prices, we note that there is also evidence on the terms of trade response to
4See Ramey (2006) and Perotti (2007) for a detailed discussion of identiﬁcation issues in the empirical analysis of the
ﬁscal transmission mechanism.
5government spending shocks. Employing variants of the Blanchard-Perotti identiﬁcation scheme,
M¨ uller (2008) and Monacelli and Perotti (2008) ﬁnd an appreciationof the terms of trade considering
quarterly U.S. data for and 1954–2006, respectively. Corsetti and M¨ uller (2006), on the other hand,
consider data from 1980 onwards for the U.S., Australia, Canada and the U.K. and report mixed
results.
Technology shocks Intertemporal business cycle models typically predict that technology shocks
depreciate the terms of trade, see, e.g. Backus et al. (1994). The real exchange rate is also likely to
depreciate, except if technology shocks are concentrated in the traded goods sector of the economy.
If so, technology shocks may induce an increase in the prices of non-traded goods, possibly inducing
the domestic price level to increase relative to foreign. Importantly, in this case, the terms of trade,
i.e. the relative price of traded goods, are typically depreciating as domestic supply of traded goods
increases more than demand.
In a recent contribution, however, Corsetti et al. (2007) provide an important qualiﬁcation of this re-
sult. They show that a depreciation of the terms of trade is obtained only under a speciﬁc, albeit quite
frequently used calibration of the standard international business cycle model. For alternative cali-
brations, the model predicts that technology shocks appreciate international relative prices. Loosely
speaking, three features are critical for such a reversal of the standard transmission mechanism: in-
complete ﬁnancial markets, substantial home bias, and low trade price elasticities. Intuitively, if
ﬁnancial markets are incomplete, a positive technology shock increases domestic wealth and gener-
ates a more than proportional increase in the demand for the domestic good; the more so, the more
pervasive the home bias and the less responsive trade ﬂows are to movements in relative prices. As
a consequence, the relative price of domestic goods may appreciate—thereby amplifying the initial
effect of the shock on domestic wealth relative to foreign.
The existing evidence appears to be consistent with this mechanism. Drawing on earlier work by
Gal´ ı (1999), Corsetti et al. (2006) and Enders and M¨ uller (2008) impose long-run restrictions within
a VAR model to identify technologyshocks. Corsetti et al. (2006) specifytheir VAR model in relative
terms: they use a sample of G7 economiesand consider relative variables, i.e. the value of a domestic
variable relative to the aggregatecounterpartof the remaining countries. In order to identify (relative)
technology shocks, they assume that only these shocks affect relative labor productivity in the long
run. Forthe U.S. and Japanthey ﬁnd that relative technologyshocksappreciatethe real exchangerate
and the terms of trade. Enders and M¨ uller (2008) use an alternative identiﬁcation scheme assuming
that technology shocks are the only shocks which affect the level of U.S. labor productivity in the
long run. They also ﬁnd an appreciation of the terms of trade and the exchange rate in response to
positive technology shocks.
62.2 Identiﬁcation via sign restrictions
Given that part of the evidence based on short-run and long-run restrictions is conﬂicting with the
predictions of Mundell-Fleming type models or conventionally calibrated business cycle models, we
explore an alternative identiﬁcation scheme based on sign restrictions. We start from the following
reduced form VAR model
(1) Yt = B(1)Yt−1 + B(2)Yt−2 + ...B(m)Yt−m + ut,E [utu 
t]=Σ ,
t =1 ...T,f o rs o m e -dimensional vector of variables Yt, coefﬁcient matrices B(i) of size   ×   and a
variance-covariance matrix for the one-step ahead prediction error Σ. Letting υt,w i t hE[υtυ 
t]=I ,
denote the vector of structural shocks, we need to ﬁnd a matrix A such that ut = Aυt in order to
achieve identiﬁcation.
Instead of restricting the matrix A a priori, we follow Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig (2005)
and identify structural shocksby imposing sign restrictions on impulse responsefunctions of selected
variables for a certain period k =0 ,...,K following the shock. Intuitively, we consider various
matrices A and check, for each case, whether the sign restrictions are fulﬁlled and dismiss the matrix
if this is not the case. In section 3, we use international business cycle theory to derive the sign
restrictions. Note that we will leave the sign of those responses unrestricted on which our interest is
centered.
To ﬁx ideas, let n be the number of structural shocks that we seek to identify. Mountford and Uhlig
(2005) show that identifying n shocks is equivalent to identifying an impulse matrix of rank n that is
a sub-matrix of matrix A satisfying AA  =Σ . Any impulse matrix can be written as
(2) [a(1),...,a(n)]= ˜ AQ
where ˜ A is the lower triangular Cholesky factor of Σ and Q =[ q(1),...,q(n)] is a n ×   matrix
consisting of orthonormal rows q(s), s =1 ,...,n, such that QQ  = In.
Similarly to Uhlig (2005), one can show that the impulse response to a(s) can be written as linear
combination of the impulse responses obtained under a Cholesky decomposition of Σ.L e tcji(k) be
the impulse response of the jth variable at horizon k to the ith shock in the Cholesky decomposition
of Σ and deﬁne ci(k) ∈ R  to be the vector response [c1i(k),...,c i(k)]. Then the impulse response
r
(s)
a (k) to the impulse vector a(s) is given by
(3) r(s)
a (k)=
   
i=1
q
(s)
i ci(k).
The identifying restrictions we impose to identify an impulse vector characterizing shock s are that
(r
(s)
a (k))j ≥ 0,j ∈J + and (r
(s)
a (k))j ≤ 0,j ∈J − for some subsets of variables J+ and J− and
some horizon k =0 ,...,K.
7For the actual estimation we employ a Bayesian approach. Speciﬁcally, we use a ﬂat Normal-Wishart
prior, seeUhlig (1994)foradetaileddiscussionoftheproperties, whilethe numericalimplementation
follows Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2005) and can be summarized as follows. We take a
draw from the Normal-Wishart posterior for (B,Σ) and construct an arbitrary independent standard
normal matrix M. We obtain the orthonormal matrix Q using the QR-decomposition of M such that
QQ  = I and QR = M. We construct impulse vectors a according to (2) and use (3) to compute the
impulse responses.
Considering orthogonal structural shocks may result in tight identifying sign restrictions in the sense
that many draws from the Normal-Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters (B,Σ) are rejected
because they do not permit any impulse matrices that satisfy the sign restrictions. This means that
many draws receive zero prior weight, even in cases where only few of the restrictions are mildly
violated. This issue gets more severe if the number of orthogonal shocks and the number of variables
included in the VAR model rises. To account for this we allow for small deviations ε from the sign
restrictions and deﬁne
(ω(s)
a (k))j =
⎧
⎨
⎩
max{−(r
(s)
a (k))j,0} for j ∈J +,k=0 ,...,Kand s =1 ,..,n
max{(r
(s)
a (k))j,0} for j ∈J −,k=0 ,...,Kand s =1 ,..,n
We keep the impulse responses if the sum of the squared deviations over all structural shocks, vari-
ables and horizons is smaller than ε:
(4)
 
s
 
j
 
k
 
(ω(s)
a (k))j
 2
<ε , ε≥ 0.
Inference statements are based on the posterior distribution of those draws for which (4) is satisﬁed.
In our robustness analysis we provide some discussion on the choice of ε.5
3 Sign restrictions implied by international business cycle theory
3.1 A two-country business cycle model
We now turn to a state-of-the-art business cycle model which we use to derive sign restrictions.
The model is a fairly standard medium-scale DSGE model featuring various frictions which earlier
research has found to improve the empirical performance of this class of models.6 Notably, we allow
5Alternatively, Mountford and Uhlig (2005) minimize a penalty function for sign restriction violations for each draw
from the posterior distribution for the VAR parameters. However, to account for several orthogonal shocks they sequentially
determine the optimal impulse vectors such that the ordering of the structural shocks may be important. To avoid this,
we simply allow for small deviations and draw the impulse vectors simultaneously. This also implies that, in contrast to
Mountford and Uhlig (2005), we simultaneously estimate the reduced form parameters together with the impulse matrix.
6The model is similar to those proposed by Backus et al. (1994), Heathcote and Perri (2002), Chari, Kehoe and McGrat-
tan (2002) or Kollmann (2002).
8for the possibility that prices are adjusted infrequently. The purpose of this assumption is twofold.
First, price rigidities potentially alter the transmission of real shocks, as forcefully argued by Gal´ ı
(1999). Second, this assumption allows us to study the behavior of international relative prices in
response to monetary policy shocks.
In the following we outline the model structure, while section 3.2 discusses the model simulation.
The world economy consists of two symmetric countries i ∈{ 1,2}. We refer to country 1 as the
domestic economy or ‘home’, and to country 2 as ‘foreign’.
Households In country i households allocate resources to consumption goods, Cit, and supply
labor, Hit, to monopolistic ﬁrms. Preferences are given by
E0
∞  
t=0
¯ βit
[C
μ
it(1 − Hit)1−μ]1−γ
1 − γ
(5)
¯ βi0 =1 , ¯ βit+1 =
 
1+ψ[ ¯ C
μ
it(1 − ¯ Hit)1−μ]
 −1 ¯ βit,t ≥ 0.
Here, ¯ βit is an endogenous discount factor such that discounting is higher if average per capita con-
sumption and leisure, denoted by ¯ Cit and (1− ¯ Hit), respectively,are abovetheir steady-state values.7
μ and γ are positive constants specifying the preferences of households.
Labor and capital are internationally immobile; households in country i own the capital stock Kit
and rent it to intermediate good ﬁrms on a period-by-period basis. It may be costly to adjust the level
of investment, Iit. As in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), the law of motion for capital is
given by
(6) Kit+1 =( 1− δ)Kit +[ 1− Ψ(Iit/Iit−1)]Iit,
whereδ denotesthe depreciationrate; restricting Ψ(1) = Ψ (1) = 0,a n dΨ  (1) = χ>0 ensuresthat
the steady-statecapitalstockis independentofinvestmentadjustmentcostscapturedby the parameter
χ. Across countries there is trade in nominal non-contingentbonds, Θit, denominatedin the currency
of country i. The budget constraint of the representative household in country i reads as
(1 − τit)(WitHit + RK
it Kit +Υ it) − PitCit − PitIit
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
(Θ1t+1 + D1t+1)R−1
1t + StΘ2t+1R−1
2t − Θ1t − D1t − StΘ2t, for i =1 ,
(Θ2t+1 + D2t+1)R−1
2t +Θ 1t+1(R1tSt)−1 − Θ2t − D2t − S−1
t Θ1t, for i =2 ,
(7)
where Wit and RK
it denote the nominal wage rate and the rental rate of capital, and Υit are nominal
proﬁts earned by monopolistic ﬁrms and transferred to households. τit denotes the tax rate levied on
7In other words, the effect of consumption and leisure on the discount factor are not internalized by the household. The
parameter ψ determines how the discount factor responds to consumption and leisure; it also pins down the value of the
discount factor in steady state. See Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2003) for further discussion and Corsetti et al. (2007) for an
application in a two-country model.
9households’income; Pit is the price of the ﬁnal good deﬁned below; Rit is the gross nominal interest
rate, Dit denotes debt issued by the governmentin country i held by domestic residents, and St is the
nominal exchange rate. In each country, households maximize (5) subject to (6), (7) and a non-Ponzi
scheme condition.
Final good ﬁrms Consumption and investment goods are composite goods which households pur-
chase from ﬁnal good ﬁrms. These ﬁrms operate under perfect competition and buy intermediate
goods from a continuum of monopolistic competitive ﬁrms. We use j ∈ [0,1] to index those interme-
diate good ﬁrms as well as their products and prices. Further, let Ait(j) and Bit(j) denotethe amount
of good j, originally produced in country 1 and 2, respectively,used in country i to assemble the ﬁnal
goods Fi. These are produced under the following technology
(8) Fit =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
ω
1
σ
    1
0 A1t(j)
 −1
  dj
   
 −1
  σ−1
σ
+(1− ω)
1
σ
    1
0 B1t(j)
 −1
  dj
   
 −1
  σ−1
σ
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
σ
σ−1
, for i =1
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎣
ω
1
σ
    1
0 B2t(j)
 −1
  dj
   
 −1
  σ−1
σ
+(1− ω)
1
σ
    1
0 A2t(j)
 −1
  dj
   
 −1
  σ−1
σ
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎦
σ
σ−1
, for i =2
where σ denotes the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods (‘trade price elas-
ticity’, for short) and   measures the elasticity of substitution between goods produced within the
same country. The parameter ω measures the home bias in the composition of ﬁnal goods. Let PA
it (j)
bethepricein countryi ofanintermediategoodproducedincountry1andPB
it (j) thepricein country
i of a good produced in country 2. Assuming that the law of one price holds, we have
(9) PB
1t(j)=StPB
2t(j); PA
1t(j)=StPA
2t(j).
The price for ﬁnal goods is given by
(10) Pit =
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
 
ω
 
PA
1t
 1−σ +( 1− ω)
 
PB
1t
 1−σ  1
1−σ , for i =1
 
(1 − ω)
 
PA
2t
 1−σ + ω
 
PB
2t
 1−σ  1
1−σ , for i =2
,
where
(11) PA
it =
   1
0
PA
it (j)1− dj
  1
1− 
and PB
it =
   1
0
PB
it (j)1− dj
  1
1− 
denote the GDP deﬂators in home and foreign, respectively.
10Theproblemof ﬁnalgoodﬁrms isto minimize expendituresinassemblingintermediategoodssubject
to (8) and the requirement that Fit = Cit + Iit. The ﬁrst order condition that characterizes ﬁnal good
ﬁrms’behaviorinequilibrium implicitly deﬁnesthedemandforagenericintermediategoods,Y D
it (j).
For future reference, taking the perspective of the home country, we deﬁne the real exchange rate as
follows
(12) RXt = StP2t/P1t,
such that an increase correspondsto a depreciation. Terms of trade are deﬁned as the price of imports
relative to the price of exports: PB
1t/PA
1t. Note that up to a ﬁrst order approximation the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate are perfectly correlated to the extent that ω>1/2.
Intermediate good ﬁrms At the intermediate good level, ﬁrms specialize in the production of dif-
ferentiated goods. A generic ﬁrm j ∈ [0,1] in country i engages in monopolistic competition facing
imperfectly-elastic demand from domestic and foreign ﬁnal good producers, as well as domestic
governments which are assumed to consume only domestically produced goods, as discussed below.
Production of intermediate goods is Cobb-Douglas:
(13) Yit(j)=eZitKit(j)θHit(j)1−θ,
where Zit denotes the level of technology common to all ﬁrms. It evolves exogenously according to
(14) Zit = ρzZit−1 + ρzzZ t−1 + εz
it,
suchthat ρz capturesthe degreeof autocorrelation and ρzz possiblespillovers acrosscountries. Labor
and capital inputs of ﬁrm j, Hit(j) and Kit(j), are adjusted freely in each period. Price setting,
however, is constrained exogenouslyby a discrete time version of the mechanismsuggestedby Calvo
(1983). Each ﬁrm has the opportunity to change its price with a given probability 1 − ξ.W h e n a
ﬁrm has the opportunity, it sets the new price in order to maximize the expected discounted value of
net proﬁts; otherwise prices are indexed to past inﬂation, where the degree of indexation is given by
ι ∈ [0,1]. When setting the new price PA
1t(j) or PB
2t(j), the problem of a generic intermediate good
ﬁrm j in country i is given by
(15) max
∞  
k=0
ξkEt
 
ρit,t+kYit+k(j)
 
PA
it (j)(PA
it+k−1/PA
it−1)ι − MCit+k
 
/Pit+k, for i =1
ρit,t+kYit+k(j)
 
PB
it (j)(PB
it+k−1/PB
it−1)ι − MCit+k
 
/Pit+k, for i =2
subject to the production function (13) and the optimal choice of factor inputs which minimizes
marginal costs, MCit.8 Proﬁts are discounted with the factor ρit,t+k, for which we assume ρit,t+k =
¯ βit+kUC(Cit+k,H it+k)/(¯ βitUC(Cit,H it)), because ﬁrms are owned by households.
8In this formulation we impose the constraint that demand is met by actual production at all times: Yit(j)=Y
D
it (j)+
Y
G
it (j), where that last term denotes the demand stemming from government consumption.
11Fiscal and monetary policy Government policies are characterized by feedback rules. Turning
to ﬁscal policy ﬁrst, we assume that government spending, Git, consists of a bundle of intermediate
goods. Speciﬁcally,we use anaggregationtechnologyanalogousto (8), exceptthatonly domestically
produced goods enter the consumption basket of the government.9 Governmentconsumption evolves
according to the following feedback rule:
(16) Git =( 1− ρg)Gi + ρgGit−1 + ϕy(Yit − Yi) − ϕd(Dit − Di)+εG
it,
where letters without time subscriptrefer to steadystate values; ρg capturespersistence,while ϕy and
ϕd measure to what extent government spending responds to the deviation of output and debt from
their steady-state values. εG
it is an i.i.d. innovation to government spending.10 Regarding the tax rate
we assume the following relationship
(17) τit = τi + ϕτ
Dit − Di
Yi
,
where ϕτ ≥ 0 measures how strongly the tax rate adjusts to the level of debt.11 The budget constraint
of the government in country i is given by
(18) Dit −
Dit+1
Rit
= τit(WitHit + RK
it Kit +Υ it) − PG
it Git,
where PG
it is the price index of government consumption.
Monetary policy is characterized by an interest feedback rule, whereby the nominal interest rate is
adjusted in response to domestic (i.e. producer-price) inﬂation and the output gap as, for instance, in
Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005):
(19) Rit = ρrRit−1 +( 1− ρr)(R + φπ(ΠP,it − ΠP)+0 .25φyyit)+νit,
where ΠP,it and yit =( Yit − Yi)/Yi denote domestic inﬂation and the output gap (deﬁned as devia-
tions from the steady-statevalue), respectively;ρr ≥ 0 capturesinterest rate smoothing,while φπ and
φy denote the long-run (producer-price) inﬂation and output gap semi-elasticity of short-term interest
rates; νit is an i.i.d. exogenous monetary policy shock.
9Put differently, we assume that government goods are assembled in the same way as in (8), with ω =1 . The evidence
discussed in Corsetti and M¨ uller (2006) suggests that the import content in government spending is generally less than half
the import content in private spending. As a ﬁrst approximation it is thus reasonable to assume zero import content in
government spending.
10Rules of this type have been estimated by Gal´ ı and Perotti (2003), among others.
11In the simulation of the model we only allow for values of {ϕτ,ϕ d} such that government debt is stationary. It is
interesting to observe that in the case of ϕτ =0 , all ﬁnancing of government spending occurs through reduced future
spending. As a result, the standard wealth effect of government spending is absent in this case.
12Equilibrium We characterize the equilibrium of the model through the ﬁrst-order conditions of
households and ﬁrms as well as the feedback rules (16), (17), and (19). In specifying the ﬁrms’
problem we implicity imposed market clearing conditions. Hence, to pin down the equilibrium allo-
cation, we merely require the budget constraints of both governments and the domestic household to
be satisﬁed.
3.2 Model simulations
We are interested in the model predictions regarding the sign of the responses of various variables to
technology, government spending as well as monetary policy shocks. We also consider the effects of
the latter, becausethey are likely to contribute considerably to real exchangerate ﬂuctuations, as doc-
umented, for instance, by Clarida and Gal´ ı (1994). To compute the responses, we solve numerically
a linear approximation of the equilibrium conditions around a deterministic, symmetric, zero-debt
steady state. Because the terms of trade display the same dynamics as the real exchange rate as long
as domestic goods make up for more than half of ﬁnal goods production, we focus on the behavior
on the real exchange rate in the following discussion. Yet, when turning to the data we will consider
both variables separately.
The structure ofour modelis fairly rich and basedon earlier work aimed atincreasingthe quantitative
realism of this class of models. Yet, there remains uncertainty as to the values of certain parameters
which may have a bearing not only on the quantitative effects of a particular shock, but may govern
even the sign of the response of certain variables. In order to ensure that our sign restrictions are
robust with respect to different parameterizations of the model, we adopt the following procedure.
A ﬁrst set of parameters is held constant throughout all simulations. It is displayed in the upper
panel of table 1. These parameters are fairly uncontroversial in the literature or directly related to
ﬁrst moments of the data through steady-state relationships. Regarding preferences and technology,
characterizedbyβ,γ,μ,θandδ, wefollow Backusetal. (1994). Weassumethatthereisconsiderable
home bias in the composition of ﬁnal goods, i.e. ω =0 .85. Assuming that government spending
accounts for 20 percent of GDP implies an import share of 12 percent in steady state—corresponding
to the average import share in the U.S. in our sample period. The government share also implies that,
absent steady-state zero debt, the tax rate is 20 percent in steady state. Finally, for the elasticity of
substitution between monopolistically produced goods,  , we use a value which implies a markup of
intermediate good producers close to 15 percent.
The values of a second set of parameters are more controversial. In order to derive sign restrictions
which are robust with respect to variations in these parameters, we randomize the parameterization
of the model and compute impulse responses for each draw. The second panel of table 1 displays
the intervals from which we draw values for each simulation of the model, assuming uniform and
13Table 1: PARAMETER VALUES USED IN SIMULATION
Parameter Description Value/Range
Constant values
β Discount factor (steady state) 0.99
μ Consumption share 0.34
γ Risk aversion 2.00
θ Capital share 0.36
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
ω Home bias in ﬁnal goods 0.85
g Government spending (steady state) 0.2
  Elasticity of substitution 8
Randomized parameter values
χ Investment adjustment costs [0.10,3.00]
ξ Fraction of prices kept unchanged [0.10,0.90]
ι Indexation of prices [0.00,1.00]
φπ Inﬂation elast. of interest rate [1.50,2.15]
φy Output elast. of interest rate [0.00,0.50]
ρi Interest rate smoothing [0.50,0.95]
ρg Government spending persistence [0.70,0.90]
ϕy Output gap elasticity of G-spending [−0.2,0.20]
ϕd Debt elasticity of G-spending [0.02,0.04]
ϕτ Debt semi-elasticity of tax rate [0.02,0.04]
ρz Technology persistence [0.80,0.90]
ρzz Technology spillover [0.00,0.09]
σ Trade elasticity [0.10,0.30] or [1.00,2.00]
Notes: Parameter values used in simulation of the model. Parameter values in upper panel are kept
constant; lower panel displays intervals from which values are drawn for each simulation of the model.
independentdistributions. Regardingχ, the parametercapturinginvestmentcosts,we considervalues
from 0.1 of up to 3, the upper end of the values reported in Christiano et al. (2005). Concerning price
rigidities we allow for the whole range from zero to full indexation and, similarly, we consider a wide
range for the degree of price rigidities ξ, thereby accounting for the recent debate on the extent of
price rigidities.12 With respect to the interest rate feedback rule, we allow for values which span the
range of results reported by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) and others. Our admissible range of
parameter values for coefﬁcients in the government spending feedback rule is guided by the results
reported in Gal´ ı and Perotti (2003). The tax rule coefﬁcient is speciﬁed such that deﬁcits display
considerable persistence, see Corsetti and M¨ uller (2008). Finally, for the persistence of technology
12While the early new Keynesian literature, e.g. Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999), has suggested considerable price rigidities,
recent microeconomic evidence suggests shorter price durations, see Bils and Klenow (2004).
14shocks we assume ρz to lie within the range of 0.8 to 0.9, while possible cross-country technology
spillovers are captured by ρzz ∈ [0.00,0.09].
Regarding the trade price elasticity σ, we consider two distinct intervals.13 First, an interval with low
values, where we let σ vary from 0.1 to 0.3. Second, we consider values in the range of 1 to 2.14 We
report the results for the low and the high case separately, in order to gauge the impact of different
values of the trade price elasticity on the international transmission of both government spending and
technology shocks. As discussed above, Corsetti et al. (2007) show how this parameter may alter the
transmission of technology shocks, notably by governing the extent of implicit risk sharing through
relativepricemovementsunderincompleteﬁnancialmarkets. Ourresults belowsuggestthatthesame
mechanism is at work in the transmission of government spending shocks.
Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of the model based on 10,000 draws of the parameter vector
for both scenarios regarding the trade price elasticity, σ: the dashed lines cover 95 percent of the
responses(pointwise) if values are drawn from the high interval; the shadedarea covers 95 percent of
the responses in case values are drawn from the low interval. Impulse response bands are displayed
foranexpansionaryshocktogovernmentspending(left), apositiveinnovationtotechnology(middle)
and expansionary monetary policy shock, i.e. an exogenous reduction in the short-term interest rate
(right). On the horizontal axis we measure the periods after the shock (in quarters), on the vertical
axis we measure the difference across countries in percentage deviation from steady-state values.
We focus on relative variables (home relative to foreign), because eventually we are concerned with
the behavior of the real exchange rate, which is determined by these relative variables.15 The only
variables for which we report the response of the home country are net exports and the real exchange
rate.
The predictions of the model regarding the behavior of output and investment in response to all three
shocks are fairly clear-cut, see ﬁgure 1a. All shocks increase output and investment, except for gov-
ernment spending shocks which crowd out investment. The response of private consumption, while
being unambiguously positive for technology and monetary policy shocks, depends on the particu-
lar parameterization of the model when it comes to government spending. Conversely, the sign of
13Our experiment is thus similar to Peersman and Straub (2007), who derive sign restrictions for responses to technology
shocks in a new Keynesian model, but explicitly distinguish the ‘RBC’-case by considering a distinct set of parameteriza-
tions of the model where price rigidities are absent.
14We omit the middle range, because in this case the model predicts too high levels of exchange rate volatility. The lower
interval implies a fairly limited trade price elasticity. In this context, it interesting to observe that by virtue of a distribution
sector it is possible to obtain a low effective trade price elasticity together with a nominally high trade price elasticity,
see Corsetti et al. (2007). Moreover, note that several recent macroeconometric studies point to low values of trade price
elasticities, see Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), Kollmann (2006), and Enders and M¨ uller (2008).
15As a consequence, the identiﬁed shocks correspond to the level of relative government spending, technology, or relative
monetary policy stance. A positive innovation may thus be due to a positive innovation at home which exceeds an equally
positive innovation in foreign, or a negative innovation at home which is smaller than a negative innovation abroad—as well
as intermediate cases.
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Figure 1a: Shock transmission according to business cycle theory; Notes: Responses are in relative terms, i.e.
variables are expressed relative to foreign counterparts; Left column: increase in government spending; Middle: increase
in technology; Right: reduction in nominal interest rates; the shaded area covers 95 percent of responses (pointwise) for
low trade price elasticity case; The dashed lines display the same statistic for the high trade price elasticity case; number of
draws: 10,000. Horizontal axes: quarters; vertical axis: percentage deviation from steady state.
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Figure 1b: Shock transmission according tobusiness cycle theory; Notes: seeﬁgure1a; furthermore, variables
are expressed in percentage deviation from steady state, except for the budget balance (percentage point of GDP) and
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17the response of government spending, while being unambiguously positive for government spending
shocks, is less robust in response to technology and monetary policy shocks. These ﬁndings are the
result of assuming a quite general ﬁscal policy rule that allows current governmentexpendituresto be
ﬁnanced through debt and to be adjusted in response to the output gap.
Figure 1b shows the responses of the government budget, which unambiguously falls after a expan-
sionary government spending shock. Yet, it increases on impact after a technology shock and an
expansionary monetary policy shock, while, after both shocks, it may further increase or decline in
due course. The response of net exports is quite distinct depending on whether high or low values
for the trade price elasticity are assumed. This ﬁnding reﬂects the fact that the size of the trade price
elasticity determines whether value or substitution effects dominate the short-run dynamics of net
exports, see, for instance, the discussion in M¨ uller (2008) regarding government spending.
The response of the interest rate differs sharply across shocks. It increases after a government
spending shock, but falls after a technology and an expansionary monetary policy shock for all
speciﬁcations of the the model. The same holds for domestic (i.e. producer price) inﬂation. Be-
fore turning to the response of the real exchange rate, we note that the model—for a wide range of
parameterizations—delivers fairly robust predictions for the sign of the response of most variables.
Yet, as shown in the last row of ﬁgure 1b, the model’s prediction for the behavior of the real exchange
rate is ambiguous—even qualitatively—in response to government spending and technology shocks.
Interestingly, the sign ofthe real exchangerate responseto bothgovernmentspendingandtechnology
shocks differs systematically with the trade price elasticity. If the trade price elasticity is allowed to
take only values from the high interval (dashed lines), the real exchange rate always appreciates (i.e.
falls) for the ﬁrst six quarters after the government spending shock and always depreciates (i.e. in-
creases)in responseto technologyshocks,as standard businesscycle theory would suggest. Different
responses can be observed once we restrict the trade price elasticity to vary within the low interval.
In this case, we observe that the sign of the real exchange rate may change such that a depreciation
(appreciation) of the real exchange rate in response to government spending (technology) shocks is
possible.
At the same time we observe much stronger responses in relative consumption for the low elasticity
case (ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 1a). This ﬁnding reﬂects the fact that under incomplete ﬁnancial markets a
reversal of the response of international prices, relative to the predictions of standard business cycle
theory, brings about an ampliﬁcation of consumption risk. While Corsetti et al. (2007) provide a de-
tailed analysis in the context of technology shocks, our results suggest that also the consumption risk
stemming from government spending shocks can be ampliﬁed through relative price movements; this
ampliﬁcation becomes manifest in a depreciation of the real exchangerate in responseto government
spending shocks.
18Table 2: SIGN RESTRICTIONS:B ASELINE VAR
Expansionary shock to
Variable Government spending Technology Monetary policy
Private consumption ?+ 8 + 0
Output +2 +8 +0
Investment −4+ 4 + 0
Government spending +4 ? ?
Government budget −4+ 0 + 0
Net exports ? ? ?
Nominal interest rate +4 −4 −1
Inﬂation +0 −0+ 0
Real exchange rate (terms of trade) ?? +0
Notes: Table entries refer to quarters for which the response of a variable (in relative terms) is restricted to be non-
negative (+) or non-positive (-), ‘0’ refers to the impact response. ‘?’ indicates that the response is left unrestricted.
Table 2 summarizes the restrictions which we actually impose on the data below. Table entries refer
to quarters for which the response of a variable is restricted to be non-negative(+) or non-positive (-),
‘0’ refers to the impactresponse. ‘?’ indicates that the responseis left unrestricted. It shouldbe noted
that these restrictions, while formally shown to be consistentwith international business cycle theory,
are also in line with the received wisdom. Shocks to governmentspending are identiﬁed by imposing
that output does not fall for at least two quarters after the shock, while investment must remain non-
positive for at least one year. Government spending itself is restricted to remain non-negative and the
government budget is assumed to stay in deﬁcit for the year following the shock. The response of
net exports to government spending shocks, whenever included in the VAR model, is not restricted.
Similarly, the nominal interest rate is restricted to remain non-negative for one year, while inﬂation
has to be non-negative on impact.16 Finally, note that in line with the predictions of the model, we
leave the response of private consumption unrestricted. This seems quite reasonable, given the ﬁerce
debate on and the conﬂicting evidence of its behavior in response to government spending shocks.17
Technology shocks are identiﬁed by assuming that both consumption and output increase for two
16While the existing evidence on the effects of ﬁscal shocks on inﬂation and the interest rate based on alternative identiﬁ-
cation schemes is mixed, see, e.g., Perotti (2005) and Laubach (2005), we nevertheless impose the restriction for the impact
response in line with both received wisdom and standard business cycle theory.
17Theoretical contributions pointing toafallinconsumption include Baxterand King(1993) andLinnemann and Schabert
(2003). Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es (2007) show that an increase in consumption may be obtained in a variant of the new
Keynesian framework under the assumption that a fraction of households consumes disposable income in each period.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) document an increase in consumption in response to government spending shocks using a
VAR model estimated on U.S. data. Mountford and Uhlig (2005), in contrast, ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of spending shocks
on consumption.
19years after the shock, while investment is restricted to increase for at least one year. The responses
of government spending is left unrestricted, while the response of the primary government budget
is assumed to be non-negative on impact. We also restrict the impact response of inﬂation to be
non-positive and the nominal interest rate to fall for at least four quarters after the shock.18
To identify monetary policy shocks in addition to technology and government spending shocks, we
restrict the responses of output, investment, consumption, the government budget, and inﬂation to be
non-negative and the response of the nominal interest rate to be non-positive for at least one quarter
after the shock. In addition, we also restrict the responseofthe realexchangerate to be non-negative.
4 New evidence on the behavior of U.S. real exchange rates
4.1 Baseline speciﬁcation
We estimate the VAR model(1) where—in the baselinespeciﬁcation—thevectorof endogenousvari-
ables includesreal private consumption, real GDP, real private investment, real governmentspending,
the primary budgetbalancescaledby GDP,inﬂation computedusingtheGDP deﬂator, nominalshort-
term interest rates and the real exchange rate or the terms of trade. All variables except for the real
exchange rate and the terms of trade are in relative terms, i.e. we consider the value of a variable in
the U.S. relative to the aggregate value of the euro area, Japan, Canada and the U.K. This aggregate
is taken to be the foreign country, or the ‘rest of the world’.19 For the exchange rate and the terms
of trade we use U.S. data. Our sample consists of quarterly time series for the post-Bretton-Woods
period, ranging from 1975Q1 to 2005Q4. All variables are in logs except the interest rate and the
government budget balance. We estimate the VAR in levels and include 4 lags and a constant.
In our baseline speciﬁcation, we identify shocks to governmentspending and technology on the basis
of sign restrictions as discussed in section 2.2. The speciﬁc restrictions are derived in section 3 using
international business cycle theory and are summarized in table 2. Since in some cases it may be
difﬁcult to ﬁnd impulse matrices Q that generate impulse responsesthat fulﬁll all the sign restrictions
we allow for small deviations and set ε =0 .002. Below we perform a sensitivity analysis with
respect to the following modiﬁcations of our baseline speciﬁcation: we include net exports in the
VAR model, identify monetary policy shocks in addition to government spending and technology
shocks, and explore the robustness of our results for different sample periods. Moreover, we impose
the restriction ε =0to show thatallowing for small deviationsfrom the sign restrictions is not crucial
for our ﬁndings.
18Also Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Lind´ e (2005), using long-run restrictions, ﬁnd that inﬂation and short-term
interest rates fall in response to technology shocks.
19Aggregation issues and data sources are described in appendix A.
204.2 Results for baseline speciﬁcation
Given the estimated VAR model and the identiﬁed shocks to government spending and technology,
we compute the impulse responses functions of all variables included in the VAR model. Results
are displayed in ﬁgure 2. In all panels we plot the median as well as the 16% and 84% quantiles
of the posterior distribution of impulse responses. In our discussion of the results we will use the
term ‘signiﬁcance’ whenever both of these quantiles are either above or below zero at a particular
point in time after the shock. The left column shows the responses to a government spending shock,
the right column the responses to a technology shock. A vertical line at a particular period after the
shock indicates that the response of a variable is restricted to be non-negative or non-positive up to
this point.
The dynamic response of consumption is displayed in the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 2a. Recall that we do
not restrict its response to governmentspending shocks,which we ﬁnd to be insigniﬁcant(left panel).
ThisﬁndingisinlinewiththeevidencereportedbyMountfordandUhlig(2005)foradeﬁcitspending
shock. Technology shocks increase private consumption for an extended period. In fact, while the
responseis restricted to be positive for 8 quarters, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantincrease for about 10 quarters.
In line with the evidence reported by Perotti (2005) for a post-1980 sample as well as Mountford
and Uhlig (2005), we ﬁnd a very short-lived increase in output in response to government spending
shocks. In contrast, technology shocks increase output signiﬁcantly for about 3 years after the shock.
Theresponseof privateinvestmentdiffers sharplyfor bothshocks. While it is restricted to benegative
(positive)foroneyearfollowinggovernmentspending(technology)shocks,weﬁndthattheidentiﬁed
shocksinducesigniﬁcantinvestmentresponsesforatleast2-3years. Thelastrowofﬁgure2adisplays
the response of government spending. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant response to technology shocks,
but detect considerable persistence after a spending shock: government spending is likely to exceed
its trend value for up to four years after the spending shock.
The response of the government budget balance, which is displayed in the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 2b
partially reﬂects this: while by construction its response to a government spending shock is negative
for two quarters, it remains in deﬁcit during the ﬁrst 15 quarters. In contrast, the budget balance
improves signiﬁcantly for an extended period in response to a technology shock. The interest rate
response, depicted in the second row, is positive (negative) after a spending (technology) shock.
The response, however, is reversed at some point for both shocks. The inﬂation response shown
in the third row of 2b shows considerable persistence. While its impact response is restricted to
be positive (negative), it remains positive (negative) for an extended period after the government
spending (technology) shock.
The last two rows of ﬁgure 2b display the dynamicbehaviorof the real exchangerate andthe terms of
trade. We ﬁnd that both the real exchangerate and the terms of trade depreciate(i.e. increase)after an
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Figure 2a: Results for baseline speciﬁcation; Notes: solid lines display the median responses as well as the 16
and 84 quantiles. Vertical lines indicate that the sign of a response has been restricted for the period up to the vertical line.
Horizontal axes: quarters; vertical axis: percent. All variables are expressed in relative terms, i.e. U.S. vs. ROW aggregate.
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Figure 2b: Results for baseline speciﬁcation; Notes: see ﬁgure 2a; vertical axis show responses in percent, except
for budget (percentage points of GDP), interest rate and inﬂation (percentage points). All variables are expressed in relative
terms, i.e. U.S. vs. ROW aggregate, except for real exchange rate and terms of trade (U.S.).
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Figure 3: The posterior distribution of the peak responses; Notes: posterior joint distribution of quarter and size
of the maximal absolute value of the response to a government spending shock (left) and technology shock (right) within
the ﬁrst 10 quarters. Results are based on 5000 draws satisfying the sign restrictions.
increase in government spending, but appreciate (i.e. fall) after a positive technology shock, at least
in the ﬁrst year after the shock. Recall that the response of neither variable is restricted, because—as
shown in section 3 above—international business cycle theory does not deliver clear-cut predictions
for the behavior of international relative prices in response to both shocks. While the real exchange
ratetendstodepreciateforanextendedperiodafteraspendingshock,itappreciatesafteratechnology
shock only on impact and tends to depreciate signiﬁcantly after about two years. In contrast, there is
no evidence for a reversal of the sign of the terms of trade response to either of the shocks.
Overall, our ﬁndings are broadly in line with recent evidence based on alternative identiﬁcation
schemes (short-run restrictions in the case of government spending shocks, long-run restrictions in
thecaseoftechnologyshocks)whichhavequestionedthereceivedwisdomontheresponseofrealex-
change rates to government spending and technology shocks, see the discussion in section 2.1 above.
In the following we take up several issues in order to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings.
First, to give a more systematic account of the uncertainty surrounding the median responses, we
follow Scholl and Uhlig (2007) and report in ﬁgure 3 the posterior joint distribution of the timing
and the size of the peak responses of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. The distribution
of peak responses to government spending and technology shocks are displayed in the left and right
column, respectively, against the size of the response and the quarter when the peak response occurs.
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Figure 4: Responses of real exchange rate and terms of trade; Notes: VAR coefﬁcients are ﬁxed at their
OLS estimate. The median as well as the 16 and 84 quantiles are presented. The dashed line plots the impulse responses
generated by a single model as proposed by Fry and Pagan (2007). Horizontal axes: quarters; vertical axes: percent.
Overall, the distribution of peaksis fairly well behaved. In case of both shocksalmost the entire mass
of the distribution leans towards the median response.
Note, however, that the posterior distribution reﬂects both sampling and model uncertainty. In order
to gauge the extent of model uncertainty, we rule out sampling uncertainty by holding the coefﬁ-
cients ﬁxed at the OLS point estimate when computing the posterior distribution of impulse response
functions. The solid lines in ﬁgure 4 display the median as well as the 16 %a n d84 % quantiles of
the posterior distribution of the responses of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. While
considerable model uncertainty is apparent, the posterior distribution of the responsesis much tighter
relative to the results reported in ﬁgure 2b. A casual comparison of ﬁgures 4 and 2b suggests that the
uncertainty surrounding our baseline results is equally due to sampling and model uncertainty.
Finally, we note that focusing on the median of the posterior distribution of impulse responses might
be problematic, particularly if several structural shocks are identiﬁed. Fry and Pagan (2007) point
out that the posterior distribution of impulse responses is a distribution across different identiﬁed
models such that the median impulse response functions to two shocks are generated by two different
impulse matrices Q. Since this means that the responses are generated from two different models,
the identiﬁed shocks associated to the median responsesare not necessarily orthogonal. We therefore
follow Fry and Pagan (2007) and present the impulse responses that are simultaneously generated
by a single model. We apply their suggested rule and choose the impulse matrix Q that generates
responses which are as close to the medians as possible. Results are displayed by the dashed line in
ﬁgure 4. Reassuringly, we ﬁnd that the median responses obtained under our baseline speciﬁcation
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Figure 5: Responses of real exchange rate and the terms of trade under three shock identiﬁcation
scheme; Notes: see ﬁgure 2a.
are not very sensitive to this adjustment.
4.3 Monetary policy shocks
In our baseline speciﬁcation, we have identiﬁed only government spending and technology shocks
while imposing that these shocks are mutually uncorrelated. In this subsection, we identify monetary
policy shocks as well, because results from earlier studies suggest that monetary policy shocks are
an important source of exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Identifying monetary policy shocks jointly with
technology and governmentspending shocksand imposing that all three structural shocksare orthog-
onal allows us to assess whether our baseline results are somehow contaminated by monetary policy
shocks. Once more, we rely on sign restrictions derived from international business cycle theory as
discussed in section 3 and summarized in table 2.
Figure 5 displays the results for the real exchange rate and the terms of trade obtained under this
identiﬁcation scheme. We ﬁnd that the responses of international relative prices are hardly altered
relative to the identiﬁcation scheme where we do not identify monetary policy shocks explicitly. In
response to expansionary monetary policy shocks, both the real exchange rate and the terms of trade
depreciate. While we restrict the impact response to be non-negative, we ﬁnd a protracted depre-
ciation and a mildly hump-shaped adjustment. Such a pattern is well documented for the response
of the nominal exchange rate in response to monetary policy shocks. It has been dubbed ‘delayed
overshooting puzzle’, because standard models predict the exchange rate to peak in the period of the
26G-shock Z-shock R-Shock
S
h
o
c
k
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
S
h
o
c
k
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
,
O
L
S
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
D
e
c
o
m
p
.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
−470
−460
−450
−440
−430
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
−470
−460
−450
−440
−430
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
−470
−460
−450
−440
−430
Figure 6: Estimated shock processes and historical decomposition of the real exchange rate under
three-shock identiﬁcation scheme; Notes: First row shows four quarter moving average of median of estimated
s h o c ks e r i e sa sw e l la st h e16 and 84 quantiles. Second row displays the median response holding the VAR parameters ﬁxed
at OLS point estimate (solid line) and the shock processes generated by a single model as proposed by Fry and Pagan (2007)
(dashed line). Third row shows historical decomposition of the real exchange rate (in logs) generated by a single model
as proposed by Fry and Pagan (2007); solid line plots the data; dotted line plots decomposition if no shocks had occurred;
dashed line plots decomposition if only ﬁscal, technology or monetary shocks had occurred.
shock, see Scholl and Uhlig (2007) for recent evidence.20
As a way to assess the plausibility of our identiﬁcation scheme, in ﬁgure 6, we plot four quarter
moving averages of the estimated shocks obtained under the three-shock identiﬁcation scheme. In
the panels of the upper row, the solid lines display the median, while the dashed lines display the
16 and 84 % quantiles of the estimated shock process. However, since these shocks may come from
different models, they are potentially correlated. Therefore, we again follow the suggestion of Fry
and Pagan (2007) and compute shock series from a single model. The results are displayed in the
panels of the second row of ﬁgure 6. The solid line refers to the median response holding the VAR
parameters ﬁxed at the OLS point estimate while the dashed lines display the shocks obtained under
the single model which generates impulse responses as close to the median as possible. The median
20Figure A-1 displays the responses of all endogenous variables for the three shock identiﬁcation scheme.
27Table 3: BUSINESS CYCLE VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION
Business cycle variation due to shocks to
Variable Government spending Technology Monetary policy
Private consumption 0.09, [0.09] 0.25, [0.30] 0.17, [0.14]
Output 0.08, [0.08] 0.24, [0.23] 0.28, [0.27]
Investment 0.08, [0.08] 0.09, [0.13] 0.44, [0.29]
Government spending 0.25, [0.41] 0.21, [0.23] 0.12, [0.26]
Government budget 0.07, [0.08] 0.54, [0.12] 0.33, [0.34]
Nominal interest rate 0.33, [0.37] 0.16, [0.15] 0.58, [0.40]
Inﬂation 0.12, [0.12] 0.31, [0.34] 0.41, [0.32]
Real exchange rate 0.15, [0.18] 0.52, [0.41] 0.22, [0.27]
Entries refer to the business cycle variance decompositions generated by a single model as proposed
by Fry and Pagan (2007). Statistics are computed on HP-ﬁlteredseries using a smoothing parameter
of 1600. Statistics inbrackets are the medians of the posterior distributiongiven the ﬁxed OLSpoint
estimate.
shock processes (upper row) and those implied by the single model look rather similar.
Overall, the identiﬁed shock processes are consistent with several familiar narratives concerning im-
portantmacroeconomicepisodesduringthelastthreedecades. Focusingontheresultsobtainedunder
the single model (second row, dashed line) and turning ﬁrst to relative government spending shocks,
we observe spikes during the Carter-Reagan build-up around 1980 and as well as after 9/11. Re-
garding relative technology shocks, strong positive innovations during the late 1990s can be detected
consistent with the notion of a distinct productivity driven upturn in the U.S. Finally, our measure for
relative monetary policy shocks indicates a considerable monetary tightening during the early 1980s
under the Volcker chairmanship. We also ﬁnd expansionary monetary policy shocks during the early
1990s, followed by a sharp monetary contraction. It is conceivable that these relative shocks reﬂect
not only developments in the U.S., but also in Europe where monetary policy was excessively tight
in a number of countries after German reuniﬁcation and become much looser after the EMS crisis in
1992, notably in the U.K. after its exit from the exchange rate arrangement.
The last row of ﬁgure 6 plots the historical decomposition of the real exchange rate considering
shocks to government spending, technology and monetary policy separately. A casual interpretation
suggests that among the three shocks technology shocks explain most of the variance. Additionally,
table 3 displays results of a business cycle variance decomposition. Entries correspond to the fraction
of variance due to each of the identiﬁed shocks (under the single model) after applying the HP-
ﬁlter to time series obtained from the VAR model under the counterfactual simulation that only one
of the shocks had occurred. In brackets, we report the corresponding statistic from the medians
28of the posterior distribution given the ﬁxed OLS point estimates. Overall, shocks to government
spendingexplainasmallfraction ofthebusinesscyclevariation: only8 to9 percentofthe variationin
consumption, output and investment is due to ﬁscal policy. In contrast, technology (monetary policy)
shocks generate 25 and 24 (17 and 28) % of the variation in consumption and output. The business
cycle variance of investment is to a large extent driven by monetary policy shocks (44 %). Moreover,
monetarypolicyshocksaccountfor58 and41% ofthe businesscyclevarianceofthe nominalinterest
rate and inﬂation, respectively. Technologyshockshavea large impact on inﬂation while government
spending shocks seem to matter for the variance of the nominal interest rate. Turning to the real
exchange rate, we ﬁnd that 15, 52 and 22 percent of its variance is due to shocks to government
spending, technology and monetary policy, respectively.
4.4 Further sensitivity analysis
In this section we consider additional variations of our baseline speciﬁcation in order to assess the
sensitivity of our results. First, we set ε =0 , i.e. we impose the sign restrictions in a restrictive
way. We ﬁnd little change in the responses of the real exchange rates, see ﬁgure A-2 in the appendix.
Note however, that for ε =0many draws from the Normal-Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters
(B,Σ) receive zero prior weight such that the search for impulse responsesthat fulﬁll all sign restric-
tions is cumbersome. Therefore, in case ε =0is imposed, inference is based on approximately 100
draws satisfying the sign restrictions compared to 5000 draws in our baseline speciﬁcation shown in
ﬁgures 2a, 2b and 3.
We conduct additional sensitivity analysis regarding the sample period. Speciﬁcally, we consider
two alternative starting dates: 1973Q1 and 1980Q1. The results, reported in ﬁgure A-3, indicate that
results obtained under the baseline speciﬁcation are fairly robust with respect to the sample period
under consideration.
Finally, we assess whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of net exports in the VAR model.
Our results, reported in ﬁgure A-4, show that this is not the case. Interestingly, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
responseofnetexportsto eitherspendingortechnologyshocks,consistentwiththeﬁndingsofseveral
other VAR studies suggesting that the effect of government spending shocks on the trade balance is
quite contained, see Corsetti and M¨ uller (2006) for the U.S. With respect to technology shocks, we
ﬁnd a marginally signiﬁcant decline of the trade balance after about two years. This squares well
with the evidence reported in Enders and M¨ uller (2008) who ﬁnd a hump-shaped decline in the trade
balance in response to positive technology shocks identiﬁed on the basis of long-run restrictions.
295C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we provide fresh evidence on the response of international relative prices to government
spending and technology shocks. We start from three observations. First, the real exchange rate and
the terms of trade are key variables governing the international transmission mechanism. This has
been most forcefully illustrated by Corsetti et al. (2007) in the context of technology shocks. Second,
the existing evidence on the behavior of international relative prices in response to technology and
spending shocks conﬂicts with the predictions of international business cycle models under standard
calibrations. Third, the evidence to date is mostly based on estimated VAR models where identiﬁca-
tion is achieved either through short-run or long-run restrictions.
We establish newevidenceby employing an alternativeidentiﬁcation scheme. Speciﬁcally, we follow
Uhlig (2005)andrestrictthe sign ofthoseresponseswhichwe canshowto be largely uncontroversial.
Our baseline VAR model contains eight variables: private consumption, output, private investment,
government spending, the primary government budget balance, inﬂation, the nominal interest rate—
all measured for the U.S. relative to an aggregate of industrialized countries—and the real effective
exchange rate or the terms of trade.
We derive sign restrictions from a two-country DSGE model by simulating its impulse response
functions for a wide range of parameterizations. In response to government spending and technol-
ogy shocks, the model does provide robust predictions for the sign of several key variables, which
conform well with the conventional wisdom on the international transmission mechanism. It does
not, however, provide clear-cut predictions for the behavior of the real exchange rate and the terms
of trade, because of the wide range of parameterizations which we consider. This result is key to our
identiﬁcation strategy: it allows us to restrict the responses of several variables included in the VAR
model, but to remain agnostic about the response of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade.
We estimate the VAR model on quarterly time series covering the period 1975–2005. Considering
various speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that expansionary government spending shocks depreciate the real
exchange rate as well as the terms of trade. Positive technology shocks, in contrast, appreciate the
real exchange rate and the terms of trade. Our results are largely in line with the evidence reported in
recent studies which employ alternative identiﬁcation schemes. They also appear robust with respect
to several variations of our baseline speciﬁcation.
Taking a theoretical perspective, our results support to the notion that movements in international
relativepricesamplifyratherthanmitigatetheconsumptionriskassociatedwithgovernmentspending
and technology shocks—in contrast with the predictions of conventionally calibrated business cycle
models.
30AD a t a
A.1 Sources
The data usedin this paperare from the OECD EconomicOutlook and the Main EconomicIndicators
databases taken from OECD (2008), and the Area-Wide Model database of the ECB, as described in
Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001). Governmentspendingincludes governmentspending on goods and
services (government consumption), but neither investment nor transfers. We leave out government
investment because of an accounting problem in the U.K. in 2005Q2. We do not consider trans-
fers, in order to ensure comparability of our results with those obtained under the Blanchard-Perotti
identiﬁcation scheme.
OECD Economic Outlook for Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States and the euro
area: ’Gross domestic product (market prices), volume’; ’Private consumption, volume’; ’Govern-
ment consumption, volume’; ’Private ﬁxed investment (excl. stockbuilding), volume’; same source
except for the euro area: ’Interest rate, short-term’; ’Primary government balance, % GDP’; ’Exports
of goods and services, value, local currency’, ’Imports of goods and services, value, local currency’,
and ’Gross domestic product (Market prices), value’ for the calculation of the trade balance over
GDP; ’Export price goods and services, local currency’, and ’Import price goods and services, local
currency’ for the construction of the terms of trade.
AWM database:’Short-terminterestrate(nominalin percent)’[STN];’Exportsofgoodsandservices’
[XTN], ’Imports of goods and services’ [MTN], and ’GDP’ [YEN] for the calculation of the trade
balance over GDP; ’Exports of goods and services deﬂator’ [XTD], and ’Imports of goods and ser-
vices deﬂator’ [MTD] for the construction of the terms of trade; ’Ratio gov. primary surplus/GDP’
[GPN YEN].
OECD Main Economic Indicators for the United States ’Real effective exchange rate – CPI based’.
A.2 Aggregation
In order to avoid national basis effects, we aggregate the rest of the world series by ﬁrst calculating
quarterly growth rates, then aggregating these series weighted by each country’s GDP share. Euro
area growth rates include West-Germany until 1990Q4, and uniﬁed Germany from 1991Q1 onwards
(applicable only where OECD data is used, similar reasoning had been applied to construct the ECB
AWM database). The weights were calculated at annual purchasing power parity (PPP) values in the
year 2000, based on data from International Monetary Fund (2007).
B Impulse Response Functions
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Figure A-1: Results from three shock identiﬁcation scheme; Notes: see ﬁgure 2a.
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Figure A-2: Robustness Checks: ε =0 ; The median as well as the 16 and 84 quantiles are presented. Horizontal
axes: quarters; vertical axis: percent.
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Figure A-3: Robustness Checks; The median as well as the 16 and 84 quantiles are presented. Horizontal axes:
quarters; vertical axis: percent.
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Figure A-4: Net exports; The median as well as the 16 and 84 quantiles are presented. Horizontal axes: quarters;
vertical axis: percent.
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